Cross-checking optimal monetary policy with information from the Taylor rule

Peter Tillmann

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 1, 204-207

Abstract: This paper shows that monetary policy should be delegated to a central bank that cross-checks optimal policy with information from the Taylor rule. Placing some weight on deviations from a Taylor rule reduces the stabilization bias of discretionary monetary policy.

Keywords: Optimal monetary policy; Stabilization bias; Monetary policy delegation; Robustness; Taylor rule (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E43 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Working Paper: Cross-Checking Optimal Monetary Policy with Information from the Taylor Rule (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:204-207

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.009

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