Decentralized fiscal federalism revisited: Optimal income taxation and public goods under horizontal leadership

Thomas Aronsson and Lars Persson

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 1, 223-226

Abstract: This paper concerns optimal taxation and public goods in an economic federation with decentralized leadership, where one lower level government is the first mover also in the horizontal dimension. Under plausible assumptions, horizontal leadership reinforces the incentives created by decentralized leadership.

Keywords: Optimal taxation; Redistribution; Public goods; Fiscal federalism; Decentralized leadership; Horizontal leadership (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D31 D60 D82 H21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:223-226

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.005

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