Tax audits, fines and optimal tax evasion in a dynamic context

Rosella Levaggi and Francesco Menoncin ()

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 1, 318-321

Abstract: In a dynamic optimisation framework we show that the optimal tax evasion can be either a positive or a negative function of the tax rate according to the form of the fine to be paid when evasion is detected.

Keywords: Tax evasion; Dynamic optimisation; Tax rates; Audit process; Optimal dynamic consumption (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G11 H26 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (17)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:318-321

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.043

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