The co-evolution of reciprocity-based wage offers and effort choices

Philipp Schliffke

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 1, 326-329

Abstract: I study the evolution of reciprocity in a gift-exchange game. In equilibrium, wage offers induce maximal effort but there is strong inequity in favor of the workers. The result suggests that norm-based efficiency wages may be unstable over time.

Keywords: Reciprocity; Gift-exchange; Indirect evolution; Efficiency wages (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C D J (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:326-329

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.033

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