International emissions trading: Good or bad?

Bjart Holtsmark and Dag Einar Sommervoll

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 1, 362-364

Abstract: Using a non-cooperative climate policy game applied in the literature, we find that an agreement with international emissions trading leads to increased emissions and reduced efficiency.

Keywords: Climate change; International environmental agreements; Emissions trading; Non-cooperative game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 Q2 Q4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:362-364

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.034

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