Consensus building on the FOMC: An analysis of end of tenure policy preferences

Eric Johnson, Michael Ellis () and Diana Kotenko

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 1, 368-371

Abstract: We document a behavioral idiosyncrasy in which Federal Reserve Bank presidents prefer tighter monetary policy at the end of their tenures. This suggests that consensus building on the Federal Open Market Committee occurs by moderating the policy preferences expressed by the presidents, rather than convincing them the consensus policy is superior.

Keywords: Central banking; Monetary policy; Committee decisions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (9)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:368-371

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.045

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