Yardstick competition, fiscal disparities, and equalization

Maarten A. Allers

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 1, 4-6

Abstract: The theory of political yardstick competition states that a comparison of public service levels and tax rates with those in nearby jurisdictions can provide voters with a useful instrument to assess politicians’ performance. However, we argue that fiscal disparities bias this yardstick, and that this bias may be removed through fiscal equalization.

Keywords: Yardstick competition; Fiscal disparities; Equalization (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 H77 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (29)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:1:p:4-6

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.04.076

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