Reciprocal brokered deposits and bank risk

Sherrill Shaffer

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 2, 383-385

Abstract: Economic theory predicts that reciprocal brokered deposits, by enhancing deposit insurance coverage, may reduce market discipline for banks, permitting them to take more risk in various dimensions. A newly available dataset provides empirical evidence related to that hypothesis.

Keywords: Reciprocal brokered deposits; Moral hazard; Bank risk (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Working Paper: RECIPROCAL BROKERED DEPOSITS AND BANK RISK (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:2:p:383-385

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.05.041

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