Delegation, monitoring, and relational contracts

Susanne Goldlücke and Sebastian Kranz

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 2, 405-407

Abstract: This paper analyzes in a relational contracting framework when a principal should fully delegate a task to a team of hired workers or only partially delegate the task and work herself in the team. It is shown that full delegation is more likely to be optimal under a less efficient monitoring technology, lower generated surplus, lower complementarity of efforts, or a larger team of workers.

Keywords: Relational contracts; Delegation; Monitoring; Job design; Moral hazard in teams (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D82 L22 M54 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176512003515
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:2:p:405-407

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.019

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().