A strategic mediator who is biased in the same direction as the expert can improve information transmission

Lydia Mechtenberg and Johannes Münster

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 2, 490-492

Abstract: We model strategic mediation of the communication between an informed expert with a discrete type space and an uninformed decision maker. A strategic mediator can improve communication even when he is biased into the same direction as the expert.

Keywords: Communication; Information; Cheap talk; Mediation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 D83 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:2:p:490-492

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.050

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