Nash equilibrium existence and uniqueness in a club model

Clive Fraser ()

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 2, 496-499

Abstract: We model a single-club-heterogeneous-consumer-exogeneous-income economy as an aggregative public good game. Under common assumptions, if club quality functions are homogeneous of positive degree in the club facility investment and use, an unique Nash equilibrium exists.

Keywords: Nash equilibrium; Heterogeneous clubs; Aggregative game; Homogeneous functions; Existence and uniqueness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D1 D5 H4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:2:p:496-499

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.047

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