An exploration in school formation: Income vs. Ability

Ahmet Alkan (), Nejat Anbarci () and Sinan Sarpça

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 2, 500-504

Abstract: We study stable school formation among four students that differ in ability and income. In the presence of ability complementarities and school costs to be shared, we identify the conditions under which a stable allocation is efficient, inefficient, nonexistent, and tell who become peers.

Keywords: School formation; Stable matching; Peer effects; Multilateral bargaining; Assortative matching (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 I21 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176512003813
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:2:p:500-504

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.048

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().