Incentives versus competitive balance

Marc Möller ()

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 2, 505-508

Abstract: When players compete repeatedly, prizes won in earlier contests may improve the players’ abilities in later contests. This paper determines the allocation of prizes within and across contests that maximizes the (weighted) sum of aggregate efforts.

Keywords: Contests; Incentives; Prize allocation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D02 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (13)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:2:p:505-508

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.06.051

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