Credible threats in a wage bargaining model with on-the-job search

Cristian Bartolucci

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 3, 657-659

Abstract: This note shows that in standard equilibrium search models with strategic wage bargaining and on-the-job search, renegotiation does not require mutual consent. If the worker needs a credible threat to trigger renegotiation, wages are renegotiated less frequently than in the original model.

Keywords: Credible threats; On-the-job search; Wage renegotiation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Working Paper: Credible Threats in a Wage Bargaining Model with on-the-job Search (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:657-659

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.029

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