An experimental investigation of a third-person enforcement in a prisoner’s dilemma game

Takao Kusakawa, Kazuhito Ogawa () and Tatsuhiro Shichijo

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 3, 704-707

Abstract: We experimentally study the effect of a third-person enforcement on a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game played by two persons, with whom the third person plays repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. We find that when the third person can observe these two persons’ play, the possibility of the third person’s future punishment causes them to cooperate in the one-shot game.

Keywords: Third person; Infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma; Cooperation; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C91 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:704-707

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.014

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