An experimental investigation of a third-person enforcement in a prisoner’s dilemma game
Kazuhito Ogawa () and
Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 3, 704-707
We experimentally study the effect of a third-person enforcement on a one-shot prisoner’s dilemma game played by two persons, with whom the third person plays repeated prisoner’s dilemma games. We find that when the third person can observe these two persons’ play, the possibility of the third person’s future punishment causes them to cooperate in the one-shot game.
Keywords: Third person; Infinitely repeated prisoner’s dilemma; Cooperation; Experiment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 C91 L14 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:704-707
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