More competitors or more competition? Market concentration and the intensity of competition
Flavio Menezes and
John Quiggin
Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 3, 712-714
Abstract:
We present a model of competitive interaction among n symmetric firms producing a homogeneous good that includes both Bertrand and Cournot competition as special cases. In our model the intensity of competition is captured by a single parameter—the perceived slope of competitors’ supply functions. We show that total welfare increases monotonically with the intensity of competition and the number of competitors. We then examine how the intensity of competition affects the gains from changing the number of competitors. When competition is intense, most of the gains from extra competition are captured with the entry of a small number of firms and subsequent gains from entry are small. Conversely, when the intensity of competition is small, a reduction in the number of firms can have a large impact on welfare.
Keywords: Competition intensity; Number of competitors; Mergers (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L11 L13 L41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (30)
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Working Paper: More Competitors or more Competition? Market Concentration and the Intensity of Competition (2011) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:712-714
DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.11.001
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