An empirical investigation of late bidding in online auctions

Tarek Ben Rhouma and Georges Zaccour

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 3, 715-717

Abstract: Why do some participants in online auctions place their bids right before the time of closing? Using e-Bay data, we propose count-data models to look at both the presence of the late-bidding phenomenon and its intensity. Our results reveal significant differences between extremely late-bidders (snipers) and moderately late-bidders.

Keywords: Late bidding; Internet auctions; EBay; Count models (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D4 H4 L8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:715-717

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.022

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