Matching as a cure for underprovision of voluntary public good supply

Wolfgang Buchholz (), Richard Cornes and Dirk Rübbelke

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 3, 727-729

Abstract: Matching mechanisms are widely regarded as providing a promising way to cure the public good underprovision problem, but the Pareto optimal interior matching equilibrium emerges only under very special conditions. However, we show that public good underprovision is normally avoided.

Keywords: Public goods; Matching; Pareto optimality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 H41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:727-729

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2011.12.095

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