Disentangling disproportionality

Thomas Poulsen

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 3, 743-745

Abstract: The literature on deviations from one share-one vote seems to ignore that a difference between influence and investment, i.e., disproportionality, may exist without control enhancing mechanisms such as dual class shares. I propose a method to disentangle disproportionality and argue for its relevance. The consequences are documented on a testing data set.

Keywords: Ownership structure; Disproportionality; Voting power; Firm value (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G32 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:743-745

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.036

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