On take it or leave it offers in common agency

Seungjin Han

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 3, 777-781

Abstract: If the agent’s preference relation satisfies a strict monotonicity condition in common agency under the asymmetric information, the set of all equilibrium allocations in the menu game where menus of contracts are allowed coincides with the set of all equilibrium allocations in the single contract game where only single contracts are allowed.

Keywords: Take it or leave it offers; Menus; Common agency; Mechanism design (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
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Related works:
Working Paper: On Take It or Leave It Offers in Common Agency (2012)
Working Paper: On Take It or Leave It Offers in Common Agency (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:777-781

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.07.039

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