Contests with endogenous discrimination

Sanxi Li and Jun Yu

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 3, 834-836

Abstract: This paper builds a complete information contest model with endogenous discrimination. We show that a revenue-maximizing contest designer will optimally set a bias towards a weaker contestant against a stronger contestant and completely eliminate the asymmetry between the two. Moreover, in contrast to fair contest models, where the revenue-maximizing contest designer is better off if the weaker contestant becomes stronger or the stronger contestant becomes weaker, our model shows that the opposite result may arise.

Keywords: All pay auction; Endogenous discrimination; Contests (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (28)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176512005095
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:834-836

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.047

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().