Preferential treatment in procurement auctions through information revelation

Domenico Colucci, Nicola Doni () and Vincenzo Valori

Economics Letters, 2012, vol. 117, issue 3, 883-886

Abstract: We study a model of procurement auctions in which information policies can be used to treat two heterogeneous suppliers asymmetrically. The buyer is shown to be better off revealing information about her preferences to the weak supplier only, when there is a sufficient cost difference between the weak and the strong. Conversely, when the two competitors have similar cost structures, for the buyer it is best to disclose her preferences publicly.

Keywords: Procurement; Information revelation; Discriminatory policy; Asymmetric auctions (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 H57 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2012
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:117:y:2012:i:3:p:883-886

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.07.001

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