Anonymity, monotonicity, and limited neutrality: Selecting a single alternative from a binary agenda

Donald E. Campbell and Jerry S. Kelly

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 118, issue 1, 10-12

Abstract: Anonymity and neutrality conflict if the number of individuals is even and a single alternative is selected. Limited neutrality, anonymity, and monotonicity imply majority rule when the agenda is a two-element set.

Keywords: Anonymity; Monotonicity; Neutrality; Social choice function (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D70 D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (10)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:1:p:10-12

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.08.028

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