Cooperative bargaining: Independence and monotonicity imply disagreement

Shiran Rachmilevitch

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 118, issue 1, 240-242

Abstract: A unique bargaining solution satisfies restricted monotonicity, independence of irrelevant alternatives, independence of equivalent utility representations, and symmetry—the disagreement solution. It is also the unique bargaining solution that satisfies independence of irrelevant alternatives, continuity, and strong disagreement monotonicity.

Keywords: Axioms; Bargaining; Disagreement solution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:1:p:240-242

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.024

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