Give and take in dictator games

Alexander Cappelen, Ulrik H. Nielsen, Erik Sørensen, Bertil Tungodden and Jean-Robert Tyran

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 118, issue 2, 280-283

Abstract: It has been shown that participants in the dictator game are less willing to give money to the other participant when their choice set also includes the option to take money. We examine whether this effect is due to the choice set providing a signal about entitlements in a setting where entitlements initially may be considered unclear. We find that the share of positive transfers depends on the choice set even when there is no uncertainty about entitlements, and that this choice-set effect is robust across a heterogenous group of participants recruited from the general adult population in Denmark. The findings are consistent with dictator giving partly being motivated by a desire to signal that one is not entirely selfish or by a desire to follow a social norm that is choice-set dependent.

Keywords: Dictator game; Choice set; Social preferences; Experiments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D63 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (56)

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Working Paper: Give and Take in Dictator Games (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:2:p:280-283

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.10.030

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