Privatization neutrality theorem revisited

Toshihiro Matsumura and Yasunori Okumura

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 118, issue 2, 324-326

Abstract: Fjell and Heywood (2004) show that privatization is not necessarily welfare neutral in mixed oligopolies under a production subsidy if firms move sequentially. We find that the neutrality holds for any time structure if instead an output floor is introduced.

Keywords: Minimum quantity regulation; Mixed oligopolies; Stackelberg; Cournot; Irrelevance results (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H42 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (34)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176512006180
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:2:p:324-326

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.11.028

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().