Privatization neutrality theorem revisited
Toshihiro Matsumura () and
Yasunori Okumura ()
Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 118, issue 2, 324-326
Fjell and Heywood (2004) show that privatization is not necessarily welfare neutral in mixed oligopolies under a production subsidy if firms move sequentially. We find that the neutrality holds for any time structure if instead an output floor is introduced.
Keywords: Minimum quantity regulation; Mixed oligopolies; Stackelberg; Cournot; Irrelevance results (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H42 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (24) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:2:p:324-326
Access Statistics for this article
Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office
More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Dana Niculescu ().