Power or loss aversion? Reinterpreting the bargaining weights in search and matching models

Giuseppe Ciccarone, Francesco Giuli and Enrico Marchetti

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 118, issue 2, 375-377

Abstract: We show that in a modified Mortensen–Pissarides model the bargaining weights depend on the players’ loss-aversion parameters. These weights can hence be calibrated without resorting to an assessment of players’ bargaining powers, which have proved difficult to empirically establish.

Keywords: Nash bargaining; Search and matching; Loss aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D81 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:2:p:375-377

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.11.034

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