Dupuit conjecture for constrained screening: Overall distortion and type-partitioning

Sergey Kokovin, Babu Nahata () and Evgeny Zhelobodko

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 118, issue 3, 439-441

Abstract: In screening with non-concave costs: (i) cycles of active IC constraints can make all packages distorted; (ii) standard screening can be less profitable than price discrimination within a consumer type using first-come-first-served rationing.

Keywords: Screening; Nonlinear pricing; Non-concave cost; Capacity constraint; Overall inefficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:3:p:439-441

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.019

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