Dupuit conjecture for constrained screening: Overall distortion and type-partitioning
Babu Nahata () and
Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 118, issue 3, 439-441
In screening with non-concave costs: (i) cycles of active IC constraints can make all packages distorted; (ii) standard screening can be less profitable than price discrimination within a consumer type using first-come-first-served rationing.
Keywords: Screening; Nonlinear pricing; Non-concave cost; Capacity constraint; Overall inefficiency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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