Rock–Scissors–Paper and evolutionarily stable strategies

Simon Loertscher

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 118, issue 3, 473-474

Abstract: This paper argues that Rock–Scissors–Paper is a stochastic game with discounting. Provided that the discount factor is less than 1, it has an evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS). This result contrasts with the one-shot normal form game, which is the customary representation of Rock–Scissors–Paper. It reconciles the finding that mutant players who tie against each other forever are never observed in real-world play of Rock–Scissors–Paper with a basic prediction of evolutionary game theory.

Keywords: Rock–Scissors–Paper; ESS; Stochastic games with discounting (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:3:p:473-474

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.017

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