Welfare effects of patent protection and productive public services: Why do developing countries prefer weaker patent protection?
Tatsuro Iwaisako ()
Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 118, issue 3, 478-481
This paper examines the welfare-maximizing degree of patent protection in a growth model where the engines of economic growth are R&D and public services. The result shows that if public services are small, the welfare-maximizing level of patent protection is weaker.
Keywords: Endogenous growth; Patent protection; Public services; Welfare analysis (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: O34 O38 O40 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Working Paper: Welfare effects of patent protection and productive public services: why do developing countries prefer weaker patent protection? (2012)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:3:p:478-481
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