Majority voting and the single-crossing property when voters belong to separate groups

Philippe De Donder

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 118, issue 3, 523-525

Abstract: We provide conditions under which a Condorcet winner exists when voters are exogenously distributed in groups, with preferences satisfying the single-crossing property separately inside each group. We also show that the majority voting social preference is acyclic.

Keywords: Spence–Mirrlees condition; Unidimensional policy space; Median voter; Anchors (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:118:y:2013:i:3:p:523-525

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.036

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