Merger and entry-license tax

Sususmu Cato () and Toshihiro Matsumura

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 119, issue 1, 11-13

Abstract: This paper investigates how horizontal mergers affect the optimal entry barrier (tax) in the presence of free entry and exit. We show that the government should raise the entry tax when a merger reduces the total number of firms entering.

Keywords: Merger; Free entry; Entry tax; Competition policy; Excess-entry theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L13 L41 L51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (8)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176513000232
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:1:p:11-13

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.038

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().