Merger and entry-license tax
Sususmu Cato () and
Toshihiro Matsumura ()
Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 119, issue 1, 11-13
This paper investigates how horizontal mergers affect the optimal entry barrier (tax) in the presence of free entry and exit. We show that the government should raise the entry tax when a merger reduces the total number of firms entering.
Keywords: Merger; Free entry; Entry tax; Competition policy; Excess-entry theorem (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: L41 L51 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:1:p:11-13
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