Strategy-proof location of a public bad on a disc

Murat Öztürk, Hans Peters and Ton Storcken

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 119, issue 1, 14-16

Abstract: In a model with finitely many agents who have single-dipped Euclidean preferences on a disc in the Euclidean plane, a rule assigns to each profile of reported dips a point of the disc. It is proved that any strategy-proof and Pareto optimal rule is dictatorial. This framework models situations where public bads such as garbage dumping grounds or nuclear plants have to be located within a confined region that has the shape of a disc.

Keywords: Single-dipped preferences; Strategy-proofness; Noxious facilities (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:1:p:14-16

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.01.012

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