Using clock auctions to dissolve partnership: An experimental study

Xiangdong Qin and Fangzhou Zhang

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 119, issue 1, 55-59

Abstract: We experimentally study clock auctions to dissolve partnerships jointly owned by two players. Subjects are found to deviate systematically from the Nash equilibrium. We explain the bidding behaviour in terms of risk aversion and/or non-standard utility theory.

Keywords: Partnership dissolution; Clock auction; Risk aversion (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 C9 D8 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:1:p:55-59

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2012.12.034

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