Information sharing with competition

Myeonghwan Cho and Byung-hill Jun

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 119, issue 1, 81-84

Abstract: This paper studies the incentive to share information with competition. Information sharing has a positive aspect in that agents have better prediction. However, it also contains a negative aspect because it might increase the competition. We show that, when agents have independent information, there is a negative relationship between the accuracy of information and the competitive pressure in deciding whether or not to share information. However, this is not always true if the agents have correlated information.

Keywords: Information sharing; Competitive pressure; Job competition (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D01 D83 J64 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0165176513000426
Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:1:p:81-84

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.01.023

Access Statistics for this article

Economics Letters is currently edited by Economics Letters Editorial Office

More articles in Economics Letters from Elsevier
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Catherine Liu ().