Credit rating agencies and elections in emerging democracies: Guardians of fiscal discipline?

Marek Hanusch and Paul Vaaler ()

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 119, issue 3, 251-254

Abstract: Analyses of budget balances in 18 emerging presidential democracies observed prior to the financial crisis of 2008–2009 show that credit rating agencies induce fiscal discipline in election years, thus reducing incentives for governments to borrow opportunistically for short-term electoral gain.

Keywords: Credit rating agencies; Elections; Fiscal policy; Political budget cycle (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F30 F34 G24 H63 O10 O23 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (7)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:3:p:251-254

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.004

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