Quota bonuses with heterogeneous agents

Barna Bakó and András Kálecz-Simon

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 119, issue 3, 316-320

Abstract: Theoretical articles on incentive systems almost exclusively focus on linear compensations, while, in practice, nonlinear elements, such as quota bonuses, are not uncommon. Our article tries to bridge that gap; it shows how the use of quotas can increase the owners’ profits, which agents are targeted by these incentives, and which factors determine the optimal bonus.

Keywords: Compensation systems; Agent incentives; Strategic delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 L13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:119:y:2013:i:3:p:316-320

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.008

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