Bonus payments as an anti-corruption instrument: A theoretical approach

Daniel Cracau and Benjamin Franz

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 1, 1-4

Abstract: We analyse bonus payments for officials, who transfer payments truthfully to the government rather than collecting bribes. We show that optimised bonus payments are always beneficial to the government, making them a more effective anti-corruption measure than simple wage increases.

Keywords: Corruption; Principal–agent game; Monetary incentives (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 J3 K4 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:1:p:1-4

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.036

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