The lottery Blotto game

António Osório

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 2, 164-166

Abstract: In this paper we relax the Colonel Blotto game assumption that for a given battle the player who allocates the higher measure of resources wins that battle. We assume that for a given battle, the Colonel who allocates the higher measure of resources is more likely to win. We have a simpler model for which we are able to compute all Nash equilibria in pure strategies for any valuations profile that players might have, something that is not possible for the original Blotto game.

Keywords: Colonel Blotto game; Lottery contest function; Allocation games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D74 H56 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (14)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:2:p:164-166

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.012

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