Step thinking and costly coordination

Enrique Fatas () and Antonio Morales ()

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 2, 181-183

Abstract: Using the experimental sessions of Goeree and Holt (2005), we show that step thinking fits the long-run outcome of minimum-effort and median-effort games surprisingly well for all values of the cost parameter. In the latter, the predicted discontinuous behaviour of step thinking accommodates the bimodal pattern observed for the intermediate values of the cost parameter quite well.

Keywords: Experiments; Step thinking; Coordination games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C9 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:2:p:181-183

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.03.032

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