Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions: A simple Nash program

Nejat Anbarci () and Ching-jen Sun

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 2, 211-214

Abstract: This article proposes a simple Nash program. Both our axiomatic characterization and our noncooperative procedure consider each distinct asymmetric and symmetric Nash solution. Our noncooperative procedure is a generalization of the simplest known sequential Nash demand game analyzed by Rubinstein et al. (1992). We then provide the simplest known axiomatic characterization of the class of asymmetric Nash solutions, in which we use only Nash’s crucial Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives axiom and an asymmetric modification of the well-known Midpoint Domination axiom.

Keywords: Asymmetric Nash bargaining solutions; Nash program; Axiomatic characterization; Noncooperative foundations; Economics of search (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C78 D74 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:2:p:211-214

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.026

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