Bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly

Ishita Chatterjee and Bibhas Saha

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 2, 280-283

Abstract: We study efficiency and distributional implications of bilateral delegation in wage and employment bargaining in monopoly. Delegation causes underproduction, and the bargaining pie severely contracts rendering mutual gains from delegation impossible. With an increase in the union’s bargaining power profit may perversely rise and the union’s utility may fall.

Keywords: Managerial incentives; Efficient bargaining; Bilateral delegation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J5 L12 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:2:p:280-283

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.009

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