Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication

Marie Laclau ()

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 2, 332-337

Abstract: I consider repeated games with local monitoring: each player observes his neighbors’ moves only. Hence, monitoring is private and imperfect. Communication is private: each player can send different (costless) messages to different players. The solution concept is perfect Bayesian equilibrium. I prove that a folk theorem holds if and only if each player has two neighbors. This extends the result of Ben-Porath and Kahneman (1996) to private communication, provided the existence of sequential equilibrium.

Keywords: Communication; Folk theorem; Imperfect private monitoring; Networks; Repeated games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 C73 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication (2016)
Working Paper: Repeated games with local monitoring and private communication (2016)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:2:p:332-337

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.002

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