Political costs and fiscal benefits: The political economy of residential property value assessment under Proposition 212
Michael Makowsky () and
Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 3, 359-363
We use a 15-year panel of property value assessment data from 351 Massachusetts municipalities. Appraised values grow more slowly in municipalities with elected assessors. When municipalities pass, via referenda, large increases in the cap on tax revenues, value assessments grow faster under appointed assessors and slower under elected assessors. Appraisals grow slower when alternative revenue sources are available.
Keywords: Property taxes; Property appraisal; Elected versus appointed; Tax referenda (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: H71 D70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:3:p:359-363
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