Monetary accommodation, imperfect central bank transparency and optimal delegation

Marcelo Sánchez

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 3, 392-396

Abstract: Optimal delegation restores the beneficial effects of non-accommodating monetary policy when the central bank is allowed to be not fully transparent about its response to wages.

Keywords: Wage setting; Central bank transparency; Monetary strictness; Optimal delegation; Calibration (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E24 E5 J51 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:3:p:392-396

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.020

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