Cheap talk with an exit option: The case of discrete action space

Takashi Shimizu

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 3, 397-400

Abstract: We consider a cheap talk model with the sender’s exit option. We show that in the case of discrete action space, it can be the case that there exists an informative equilibrium if and only if the sender’s bias is sufficiently small or sufficiently large. The latter case is sharply contrasting with the existing results of cheap talk.

Keywords: Cheap talk; Exit; Bias; Informativeness (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:3:p:397-400

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.04.023

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