Eductive learning and the rationalizability of oligopoly games

Gaetano Gaballo

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 3, 401-404

Abstract: This paper extends the eductive learning approach in settings with non-atomistic agents. It shows the connection between the characterization of rationalizable sets by Basu (1991) and the seminal result by Guesnerie (1992) in the context of Cournot oligopoly models.

Keywords: Expectational coordination; Higher-order beliefs; Eductive stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D2 D5 E1 E3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:3:p:401-404

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.014

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