Economic interactions and social tolerance: A dynamic perspective

Roy Cerqueti, Luca Correani and Giuseppe Garofalo

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 3, 458-463

Abstract: We propose an evolutionary game to analyse the dynamics of tolerance among heterogeneous economic agents. We show that: (i) intolerance is much more persistent than tolerance; (ii) a fully tolerant society assures prosperity; (iii) cultural integration should precede economic integration.

Keywords: Tolerance; Replicator dynamics; Income distribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C7 D7 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:3:p:458-463

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.032

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