Technology licensing and innovation

Arijit Mukherjee and Soma Mukherjee

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 3, 499-502

Abstract: We show that under a fixed-fee licensing contract if the licenser and the licensee bargain over the licensing fee, licensing decreases (increases) innovation by decreasing (increasing) the strategic (non-strategic) benefit from innovation. However, licensing increases innovation under a two-part tariff licensing contract. Licensing does not reduce social welfare.

Keywords: Licensing; Innovation; Welfare (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D43 L13 O34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (20)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:3:p:499-502

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.015

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