Popular protest and political budget cycles: A panel data analysis

Jeroen Klomp and Jakob de Haan

Economics Letters, 2013, vol. 120, issue 3, 516-520

Abstract: We test the hypothesis that governments facing popular protest are more likely to use fiscal policy for re-election purposes, employing data of 65 democratic countries–both developed and developing–over the period 1975–2005. Using the number of anti-government demonstrations and general strikes in pre-election years as measures of popular protest, our results lend support to this hypothesis. The effect of protest on the manipulation of fiscal policy for re-election purposes is strongest in young democracies.

Keywords: Political budget cycles; Popularity; Protest (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E62 H62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:eee:ecolet:v:120:y:2013:i:3:p:516-520

DOI: 10.1016/j.econlet.2013.05.030

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